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     1. Introduction 
The last decade witnessed the rise of cash transfer programmes (CTP) as the main tool 
of social policy in less-developed countries, mainly in Latin America. At the same time the 
growth of the world economy has caused a surge in regional exports. What are the electoral 
consequences of these processes? 
Brazil is a good example of these trends. In just four years (2002-2006) the value of 
its exports more than doubled and about one-fourth of its families receive monthly transfers 
from Programa Bolsa Família (PBF, Family Grant Programme), the federal government CTP. 
On the 29
th November   2006, more than 59 million Brazilians voted for president Lula’s re-
election, in the largest number of votes in the history of the country. One year before, this 
result could have been predicted by few, even among the “companheiros”
1. Starting from a 
very  high  level  of  popularity,  Lula  saw  his  popular  approval  drop  during  his  first 
administration, amid corruption denunciations, and recovered during the months preceding 
the re-election. In 2006, he got 61% of the valid votes in the run-off, the same percentage that 
he had got four years earlier (TSE, 2006).  
This  electoral  performance  has  generated  a  more  intense  discussion  on  voter’s 
behavior than in other campaigns. The profile of Lula’s electorate has changed. Based on 
state-level data, analysts have realized that candidate Lula won especially in less developed 
regions  of  the  country.  This  evidence  was  interpreted  in  different  ways,  according  to 
individual electoral sympathies. For the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party) voters, 
such  pattern  would  be  the  result  of  an  administration  committed  to  Brazilian  poorest 
populations.  The  opposition,  on  its  turn,  understood  this  pattern  as  the  result  of  Lula’s 
paternalist policies and/or a sign that the candidate was the choice of the less educated, the 
Brazil  of  the  past.  Others  emphasized  the  geographic  differences  between  those  who 
supported or not the president’s re-election, suggesting a north-south split in the country. We 
argue that all of these views are insufficient for understanding the phenomenon. 
Despite some exceptions, e.g, Hunter and Power (2007); Nicolau and Peixoto (2007), 
still  little  empirical  effort  has  been  made  in  order  to  investigate  the  factors  that  lead  to 
candidate Lula’s voting. Thus, the objective of this note is to test how social and economic 
variables determined the vote for candidate Lula in the presidential election of 2006, using 
spatial econometrics and spatial analysis.  
In order to reach those objectives, this note is structured in more four sessions. In the 
next  one,  we  present  a  review  of  the  hypothesis  on  Lula’s  election.  The  third  section  is 
dedicated to the application of spatial econometric analysis methods, as well as its application 
to  the  2006  election.  In the  following  section,  the  determinants  of  Lula’s  re-election  are 
discussed based on the empirical results obtained. Final considerations end this note.  
 
2. The hypotheses on Lula’s election 
Lula’s unexpected recovery and the brutal change in his electoral profile demand a 
response. Hunter and Power (2007) divide the explanations for these phenomena in three 
categories: 
a) Different responses of the voters to scandals: poor and less educated voters would 
have less access to the denunciations or would not repudiate corruption as boldly as other 
segments of the population. 
b)  Economic  factors:  voters  from  lower  income  strata  would  have  paid  back  the 
amelioration of their standards of living during the Lula administration with their votes. 
                                                 
1 This was the usual term of address among the Brazilian left in the 1970s and among the members of the union 
movement that founded the Workers.   1 
c) Focused social policies: especially PBF would have been the key to understand 
Lula’s victory.  
Let us analyze each one of those hypotheses at a time. PBF belongs to the group of 
CTP that was disseminated in Latin America since the 1990s. Heir to the programmes that 
already existed in the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, PBF, supported by the 
World Bank, became the most important social policy of the Lula administration
2. According 
to the Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (2006), PBF is a direct 
income transfer programme, subject to conditionalities, that benefits poor families (monthly 
income per capita between US$ 27.50 and US$ 55
3) and extremely poor families (monthly 
income  per  capita  up  to  US$  55).  Still  according  to  official  information,  PBF  would  be 
guided by the articulation of three dimensions for overcoming famine and poverty: poverty 
reduction through direct income transfer to the families; strengthening the exercise of social 
rights in the areas of health and education through the fulfillment of the conditionalities; 
complementary  programmes  for  overcoming  the  situation  of  vulnerability  and  poverty. 
Depending  on  the  family’s  monthly  income  per  capita  and  the  number  of  children,  the 
importance  paid  by  PBF  can  vary  between  US$  6.88  and  US$  43.58.  In  July  2006,  the 
programme reached more than 11 million families with an average benefit of US$ 28.18. In 
effective terms, PBF’s most significant dimension was undoubtedly direct income transfer
4. 
In Brazil, the hypothesis that attributes Lula’s success to his CTP was proposed even 
before the elections. The NGO Contas Abertas raised it three months before the run-off
5: 
 
With the elections coming soon, the rush for enlarging the number of people who 
benefit from Bolsa Família is in accelerated pace. Payments destined to “income 
transfers  with  conditionalities”  increased  56%  within  a  month,  from  US$  290 
million in June to US$ 454 million in July. The value spent in July was 73% 
greater than the average budget of the programme during the last six months, 
which was about US$ 263 million. (ContasAbertas, 2006) 
 
Nicolau and Peixoto (2007) analyzed the determinants of the vote for Lula in the last 
elections through econometric tests and were convinced about the CTP effect. Hunter and 
Power (2007), too, consider the hypothesis that CTP is the most relevant factor in Lula’s 
victory. 
As for economic explanations, it is worth observing some changes in the Brazilian 
economy that may have contributed for Lula’s victory. Data recently reviewed by IBGE show 
that the GDP growth, despite far from spectacular, was more significant than expected. In the 
first period of Lula’s government, GDP increased 3.3% per year, instead of the 2.6% per year 
from the original data series. Even though it is still low, this growth rate was almost one 
percentage point above the previous administration by Fernando Henrique Cardoso. In 2006, 
GDP increased 3.7%. Part of this growth was stimulated by the notable growth of Brazilian 
exports,  which  almost  doubled  in  the  period,  from  US$  73  billion  to  US$  137.5  billion 
(AliceWeb, 2007). Motivated by the growth of the world demand, this exports boom possibly 
had electoral effects. Commenting Lula’s voting, Samuel de Abreu Pessôa states: 
 
                                                 
2 For a broad criticism of the PBF, see Hall (2006). 
3 Throughout the paper, we have converted the values from Brazilian Reais to US Dollars using the average 
exchange rate for 2006 (2.18 R$/US$). 
4 For a review of electoral effects of CTPs see, for example, Molinar and Weldon (1994), Bruhn (1996), Dion 
(2000), Menocal (2001) and De La O (2006). 
5 Contas Abertas (2006).   2 
The president was well succeeded in the elections because he distributed income 
without growing, providing the demands of the majority of voters. Most of the life 
quality improvement resulted neither from Bolsa Família nor from the minimum 
wage increase. It was a combination of an external shock, with an increase in 
commodity  prices,  which  appreciated  the  exchange  rate  and  made  food  much 
cheaper, and of a series of technical advances…which also diminished the cost of 
food in Brazil. (Jornal Valor Econômico, 19 jan. 2007) 
 
Thus, there would be a causal chain through which exports would lead to a real wage 
increase for the poor, which, recognizing their welfare gains, would support Lula.  
Finally,  there  is  the  hypothesis  that  voters  would  have  different behavior  towards 
corruption accusations. Hunter and Power (2007) consider that, due to the broad regional 
disparities and the low market penetration of magazines and newspapers, part of the voters, 
especially the poorest, would not get informed about corruption denunciations. A research 
showed that in region Northeast 43% of the interviewees considered themselves uninformed 
about those accusations, while in the Southeast this figure was not above 25% (Hunter and 
Power,  2007,  p.  12).  Moreover,  still  according  to  the  authors,  pieces  of  public  opinion 
research would show that tolerance regarding patrimonialism would drop according to the 
interviewees’ educational level. In short, the poor would have voted for Lula due to ignorance 
or indifference towards the corruption accusations. 
 
3. Econometric Analysis 
 
3.1. Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis 
The data here analyzed on the municipal voting for candidate Lula in the presidential 
election  of  2006  have  as  primary  source  the  Tribunal  Superior  Eleitoral  (TSE,  Superior 
Electoral Court) website. The data are municipal, totalizing 5,507 observations. Exploratory 
Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) is the set of techniques used to describe spatial distributions of 
variables, discovering spatial correlation patterns or identifying the occurrence of clusters, or 
even  indicating  outliers  (Anselin,  1995).  In  the  present  paper,  ESDA  will  be  useful  in 
identifying  hotspots,  that  is,  municipalities  with high  participation  of  votes  for  candidate 
Lula.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the “Votes Lula%” variable by municipality in the 
2002 and 2006 run-offs. The difference in the spatial distribution of his votes is evident. In 
2002, there was a mosaic, without any large spatial concentration of Lula’s voters. In the next 
election, a distinct spatial pattern becomes clear and there is a central band of low values that 
cuts  Brazil  from  north  to  south.  It  is  also  noticeable  that,  even  though  region  Northeast 
concentrates  municipalities  with  high  voting  for  Lula,  there  is  a  broad  variation  in  the 
percentage of votes for the candidate within each state. 
Helping  to  recognize  spatial  patterns,  the  local  Moran  indicator  identifies  the 
municipalities in which there were statistically significant clusters of high or low values. The 
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Where: xi is the observed value of x (Votes Lula %) at the location x, x* is the mean 
of x, n is the number of observations and wij is the element i,j of the contiguity matrix W(1   3 
for  neighboring  municipalities  and  0  for  non  neighbors)
6.  Figure  2  evidences  the  central 
cluster of Low-Low Values, while the High-High clusters tend to be located within a large 
area more to the east of Brazil.  
 
3.2. Spatial Econometrics – Data and Specification 
The  econometric  analysis  is  based  on  data  from  three  sources:  Brazilian  Human 
Development Atlas, Superior Electoral Court and Ministry of Social Development (PNUD, 
2003;  TSE,  2006;  Ministério  do  Desenvolvimento  Social,  2006).  The  Atlas  offers  the 
explanatory variables incorporated in the regressions and has its primary source in data from 
the 2000 Demographic Census
7. Data are presented on a municipal level. Due to the creation 
of municipalities, there are differences between the municipal limits used in the 2000 Census 
and  present  limits.  Therefore,  there  is  a  lack  of  information  for  a  small  part  of  the 
observations. In spatial econometrics, one way of overcoming this problem is by replacing 
the  unavailable  value  by  its  spatial  lag  (Bhati,  2004).  This  procedure,  based  on  Tobler’s 
Law
8, has the disadvantage of inserting spatial autocorrelation in the data. In the present case, 
this cannot be done, since some contiguous observations are missing. Thus, an even simpler 
practice was adopted: the average of the observations was imputed to the missing values. 
Since this procedure was necessary in but a small number of municipalities, this imputation is 
not expected to generate a bias in the estimation.  
The initial step is the estimation of the following linear regression model, by ordinary 
least squares: 
i i i X llula ε δ α + + =
r
                  (1) 
 
in which i = 1, ...; n are municipalities; llulai is the natural logarithm of the proportion 
of votes for candidate Lula in the municipality i in the 2006 election;  i X
r
 is a vector of 
explanatory  variables  expressed  in  logarithmic  form;   δ α,   are  the  parameters  to  be 
estimated  and  i ε   is  the  stochastic  error  according  to  the  usual  hypotheses  (non-
autocorrelation, homoscedasticity and normal distribution). 
The composition of the X vector, followed by its definitions, is as follows: 
a)  Distance between the municipality and the state capital – Euclidian distance;  
b)  Inequality – Income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient in 2000; 
c)  Demographic density – Municipal demographic density in 2000, in inhabitants per 
square kilometer; 
d)  Income per capita – Municipal per capita income in 2000, in Brazilian Reais (R$). 
e)  Child mortality – Percentage of children dying under five years of age in 2000. 
f)  Illiteracy rate – Percentage of people aged 15 and over who were illiterate in the 
municipality in 2000; 
g)  Lula’s voting in 2002 – Percentage of the valid votes that the candidate got in 2002 
run-off.  
h)  Bolsa Família – Number of families assisted by CTP in July 2006 in relation to the 
total, poor and indigent population. The value was multiplied by four, the average number of 
                                                 
6 The neighboring criterion adopted in this work was that of first order Queen contiguity, in which 
municipalities are considered neighbors when they have at least one common border point. 
7 In ideal terms, data should be available on the characteristics of the municipal population in the year of the last 
presidential election. However, since the 2000 Census is the only source of data that is adequate to the present 
analysis, it is necessary to suppose that the municipal characteristics continued the same or changed without 
bias in the six years between the Census and the election. 
8 “Everything is related to everything else but nearby things are more related than distant things” (Tobler, 1970, 
p.236).   4 
family members, in order to generate an indicator of the number of individuals who benefit 
from the programme.  
Due do the data characteristics preliminarily explained in the previous section, we 
chose to go beyond traditional econometrics and use spatial econometric tools. When existing 
spatial effects are ignored, the results are biased estimators and/or erroneous inferences. Two 
spatial  specifications  are  tested  here:  the  spatial  lag  model  and  the  spatial  error  model. 
Formally: 
 
Spatial Error Model: 
i i i X llula ε δ α + + =
r
                  (2) 
i j
j
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Spatial Lag Model: 
i i j
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In the spatial error model, λ is a scalar of the error coefficient and ui ~ N (0, σ
2I) and 
W is the same binary contiguity matrix used in Moran statistics. This model is recommended 
when there are unmeasured variables that are correlated across space or when there is a poor 
match between spatial pattern of the phenomenon and the units of observation. In the spatial 
lag model, the ρWllulai component is added among the explanatory variables of the classic 
model. This component is the average (of the logarithm) of candidate Lula’s voting in the 
neighboring  municipalities.  This  specification  implies  the  existence  of  substantive  spatial 
dependence,  i.e.  neighborhood  effects  in  the  dependent  variable.  In  both  models,  the 
estimation is carried out by maximum likelihood. 
In the search for the appropriate specification, the strategy proposed by Florax et al. 
(2006) has been followed. The authors recommend estimating the classic model and testing 
for spatial autocorrelation. If it is detected, then it is necessary to choose between the error 
and the lag model. Still following the recommendations by those authors, when both spatial 
tests (error and lag) of the Lagrange multiplier are significant, the spatial correction related to 
the highest value of the test should be made. 
 
3.3. Econometric Results 
Table I presents the results of the classic model. The results indicate that Lula’s voting 
is always inelastic in relation to the right-hand side variables. The highest among them, in 
absolute value, is income per capita (and it is the only one that is inversely related: a 1% 
increase in income per capita diminishes the candidate’s voting in 0.154%), followed by 
inequality proxies (positive relation with the candidate’s voting), Bolsa Família, demographic 
density, child mortality, illiteracy and distance to the state capital. 
In  the  present  case,  the  diagnosis  tests  have  indicated  the  presence  of  spatial 
autocorrelation in the classic model, suggesting that the spatial error model should be chosen 
instead of the spatial lag model. The value of the LM test statistic for the spatial error model 
is much higher than for the lag model. In Table II, Model II presents the results of the spatial 
error model estimation with the same variables as in the first model. The fact that the spatial 
error  model  is  the  most  adequate  indicates  that  the  classic  specification  ignored  that  the 
evaluated process does not spatially correspond to the analytical units. In this case, it means   5 
that municipal border lines do not precisely delimitate the phenomenon of  Lula’s voting 
determinants
9.  
It  is  worthwhile  to  reflect  on  the  result  regarding  CTP.  In  the  initial  model,  the 
transfers, measured in per capita terms, would have had a positive effect on Lula’s voting. In 
this sense, the result here is similar to that reached by Nicolau and Peixoto (2007). These 
statements are rather audacious for a preliminary work based on a questionable econometric 
specification. The Bolsa Família per capita variable is correlated with the percentage of poor 
in the population. This, in its turn, is correlated with Lula’s voting, and thus it is more than 
expected that Lula’s voting is to be correlated with the percentage of people who benefit from 
CTP. Correlation does not imply causation and there may be a variable (the percentage of 
poor by municipality) that intermediates the relation between the Bolsa Família proxy and 
Lula’s voting. The use of the MHDI-Income variable may not be sufficient as a control and it 
would be more prudent to use other proxies that captured the programme range. Thus, instead 
of considering only total municipal populations, we additionally considered those assisted by 
the programme in relation to the poor population (Model III) or to the indigent population 
(Model IV).  
In general, the low elasticities of the variables persist, as in Model I. Besides, it is 
noticeable that elasticities of demographic density, income per capita and distance to the state 
capital  do  not  vary  much  between  the  models,  neither  in  terms  of  sign  nor  in  terms  of 
magnitude. There is also some variation in the absolute value of illiteracy and inequality 
elasticities. The “Lula’s voting in 2002” variable is positive and significant. This means that, 
despite  the  changes  in  the  electorate’s  profile,  with  due  controls,  there  was  a  spatial 
continuity  in  the  candidate’s  support  between  the  elections.  However,  its  impact  on  the 
candidate’s voting in 2006 is as important as or less important than, for example, the impact 
of demographic density or child mortality.  
As for the electoral effect of the CTP, in Model II the sign is positive and significant, 
as in the spatial model, but the elasticity is even lower. In Model III, the coefficient for Bolsa 
Família by poor is positive and significant at the 10% level, but not at 5%. Finally, in Model 
IV,  the  parameter  estimated  for  the  Bolsa  Família  by  indigents  proxy  is  not  statistically 
different from zero and does not have the same sign as in previous specifications. These 
results make the positive impact of CTP, with due controls, not as spectacular and statistically 
reliable as it would seem in a first analysis.  
 
 
4. Discussion of the hypotheses on Lula’s election 
According  to  the  econometric  results,  Lula’s  voting  was  higher  in  poorer,  more 
unequal municipalities with higher illiteracy rates. Still, there were no robust evidences that 
the Programa Bolsa Família per se had an effect on Lula’s voting. 
Consider Hunter and Power’s (2007) hypothesis that there would be distinct responses 
of the voters to corruption scandals. Actually, it divides into two theses: a) Lula’s voters were 
not informed about the scandals; b) if they were informed, they would not be as bothered 
with the facts as other social segments. Given our methods and databases, both theses are 
quite hard to be refuted (or accepted).  We tried to test thesis (a) through the inclusion of the 
variable “distance to the state capital” as a proxy for information accessibility. None of the 
regressions showed empirical support for this thesis. We admit that our proxy is problematic, 
but  there  is  no  alternative  available.  However,  against  thesis  (a)  we  note  that  90.3%  of 
                                                 
9 Classic and spatial lag estimations were carried out for all the mentioned models. The tests always suggest the 
existence of spatial autocorrelation, and – according to the present criteria – the spatial error model continued 
to be the most appropriate. For synthesis reasons, we have chosen not to present such results, which can be 
requested to the authors.   6 
Brazilian households have television (IBGE, 2005) and that  accusations against the  Lula 
administration were broadly covered by the country’s main communication networks.  As for 
part (b) of the hypothesis, the methods here adopted do not allow us to make inferences about 
its pertinence.  
The economic hypothesis raised by Pessôa (Jornal Valor Econômico, 19 Jan. 2007) 
and by Hunter and Power (2007) needs to be addressed – that is, the economic welfare gains 
of the poor would have been determinant in Lula’s election. Taking price index variations 
into account, we notice their differences according to social classes. Observing the period 
from the moment Lula took up office in January 2003 to the 2005 elections, the official 
Brazilian index of inflation, “Índice de Preços ao Consumidor Ampliado” (IPCA), which 
considers household incomes up to 40 minimum wages, increased 24% (IPEADATA, 2007). 
Over the same period, basic food basket prices calculated by Departamento Intersindical de 
Estatística e Estudos Socioeconômicos (DIEESE) had smaller increases: in the state capitals 
of Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo this index increased 8.5% and 10.4%, respectively. In 
Recife and Fortaleza, capitals of Pernambuco and Ceará, basic basket prices varied 4% and -
3% in this period, respectively. In the first state, Lula got 82% of the votes in the first round 
and 75% in the second. Even controlling for other factors, the econometric analysis show that 
these states were the ones that most supported Lula in 2006. A recent paper showed that the 
inequality in the labor market was already decreasing between 2001 and 2004 (IPEA, 2007, 
p. 14):  
  
Presented estimations show an annual growth of 7.2% for the poorest 10%, even 
though the Brazilian income per capita declined 0.9% per year in the same period. 
Considering the average income of the poorest 50%, we observe that it increased 
2.4% per year, while the average income of the richest 50% decreased 1.4% per 
year. 
 
According to the same study, the most important cause of the inequality reduction 
occurred  in  the  labor  market.  It  was  estimated  that  greater  educational  and  spatial 
homogeneity, among other factors, would have been responsible for 42% of the decrease in 
the  Gini  Coefficient  in  the  period.  CTP  would  have  been  responsible  for  10%  of  this 
reduction.  
Still in what concerns the economic hypothesis, we decided to test the direct impact of 
state exports. The econometric methodology used in this paper does not allow us to test this 
possibility. We will evaluate a much simpler effect: the possibility that the exports boom, for 
being concentrated in some states, would have also had concentrated electoral effects. Taking 
2003 as the reference year, Table III shows that the exports increase was quite scattered 
among the federative units. 
There are data on exports on a municipal level. However, these data tend to present 
distortions. For example, municipalities in which there are oil refineries or petrochemical 
plants show very high values of exports and the data is misleading. It is also worth noticing 
that it was not possible to use state GDP data, since state-level data are only available up to 
2004, and thus two key-years for our analysis would be overlooked. In this case, we have 
decided to adopt a different strategy. Instead of inserting variables referring to exports in the 
spatial regressions, we chose to compare the obtained values with the dummies
10.  
                                                 
10 The reference geographic unit for the dummy is the state of Roraima. That is, all the values on the graph are 
related to the state effect relatively to that state.    7 
On the Graphs 1 and 2, there are the effects of the state dummies
11 versus two proxies 
for the exports boom: the level of exports per capita by federative unit in 2006 and its growth 
rate between 2003 and 2006. We observed federative units such as Amapá, in which there 
were strong exports increases, and which, in fact, massively supported Lula. But the dummy 
for Amazonas had a similar positive effect, in spite of the low exports growth. In sum, both 
graphs  show  that  no  linear  relation  between  the  variables  and,  therefore,  state  dummies 
effects do not seem to be related to the exports boom
12.  
The Graphs 1 and 2 lead us to believe that the possible effects of the exports on Lula’s 
election did not occur at a state level. The relation seems to be more connected to Pessôa’s 
thesis, that is, exports generated wage increases by impacting the price level.  
 
5. Conclusions 
What determined candidate Lula’s re-election as president? The econometric analysis 
suggests that Lula’s voting was inversely related to municipal income per capita and directly 
related to child mortality, illiteracy and inequality. The distance to the state capital was not 
statistically significant. Despite the radical change in the spatial pattern of Lula’s electorate, 
his voting in 2002, with due controls, appeared to be related to his voting in 2006. It should 
be admitted one of the limitations of the present paper (and of other similar studies of PBF as 
well): no causal relationships were identified in the present spatial  econometric analysis. 
Unfortunately, there were no instrument variables available that could solve the problems of 
endogeneity that may have plagued the results. Nevertheless, the Bolsa Família Programme 
showed some evidence of positive impact on the election, but the results did not appear to be 
robust. Even if it were significant, the value of the estimator would be much smaller than 
necessary to explain Lula’s victory.  
Among the groups of explanations presented by Hunter and Power (2007), the one 
that stresses the economic factors has the strongest data support. The inequality decrease and 
the income gains in the poorest sectors of the population seemed to be the determinants. As 
demonstrated by a study carried out by the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA, 
2007), there is a recent tendency of decrease in the inequality of income distribution, and 
lower strata would benefit the most from it. A great part of those gains did not directly result 
from policies carried out in Lula’s first administration, but from structural and demographic 
changes through which the Brazilian economy has been going.  
The income gains for the poor were preserved thanks to a very low inflation rate. 
More than that, it was shown that prices tended to be more stable for products related with the 
goods consumed by the poor and in the capitals of less developed states. Even though there 
are no evidences of direct effects of the exports boom on electoral results, this change in 
relative prices indicates that the mechanism suggested by Pessôa (Jornal Valor Econômico, 
19 Jan. 2007) actually occurred. That is, the increase of exports elevated the real wages of the 
poorest through exchange rate mechanisms.  
Further quantitative analysis is surely necessary to identify the precise mechanisms 
that have lead to Lula’s upturn and re-election. However, his electoral success ceases to be 
such a challenging enigma if the explanations presented here are considered. It seems that 
voters returned their welfare gains with their votes, in Hunter and Power’s words (2007). This 
gratitude, however, was not totally deserved. The structural, demographic and educational 
changes that smoothened income concentration were already in progress when Lula came to 
power and were intensified thanks to a thriving world economy. It is ironic that his electoral 
success  is  the  result  of  economic  policies  that  are  antithetic  to  the  historical  left-wing 
                                                 
11 That is, the antilog-1 of the estimators associated to the state dummies. These values are basically similar 
among the state models, and specification IV has been chosen as a reference for this section.  
12 The relation between state exports and the dummies has been tested and, again, there was no relation.    8 
promises of the Workers Party. After all, it was the conservative monetary policy and the 
broader integration with the international economy that extended the gains of the poor and 
allowed an electoral victory in 2006. 
 
REFERENCES 
AliceWeb. Sistema de Análise das Informações de Comércio Exterior via Internet, 
(Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior). 
http://aliceweb.desenvolvimento.gov.br/default.asp, 2007. 
Anselin, L. (1995) Local Indicators of Spatial Association – LISA. Geographical Analysis v. 
27, n. 2, p.93-115. 
Bhati, A. S. (2004) Robust Spatial Analysis of Rare Crimes, Urban Institute, Washington. 
Bruhn, K. (1996) Social Spending and Political Support: The "Lessons" of the National 
Solidarity Program in Mexico. Comparative Politics v. 28, n. 2, p.151-77. 
Contas Abertas. (2006) Governo aumenta gasto com Bolsa Família em 56%.  
http://contasabertas.uol.com.br/noticias/detalhes_noticias.asp?auto=1486. 
De La O, A. L. (2006) Do Poverty Relief Funds Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a 
Randomized Experiment in Mexico. Mimeo. 
Dion, M. (2000) The Political Economy of Social Spending: The Mexican Solidarity 
Program, 1988-1994. Estudios Sociológicos v. 18, n. 53. 
Fothering, A., Brunsdon, C., Charlton, M. (2005) Quantitative Geography. London, Sage.  
Florax, R. J. G. M., Folmer, H., Rey, S. J. (2006) A Comment on Specification Searches in 
Spatial Econometrics: The Relevance of Hendry's Methodology: A Reply. Regional Science 
and Urban Economics v. 36, n. 2, p. 300-308. 
Hall, Anthony. (2006) From Fome Zero to Bolsa Família: social policies and poverty 
alleviation under Lula. Journal of Latin American Studies v. 38, p. 689-709. 
Hunter, W., Power, T. (2007) Rewarding Lula: Executive Power, Social Policy, and the 
Brazilian Elections of 2006. Latin American Politics & Society, v. 49, p.1-30. 
IPEA. (2007) Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada. Sobre a Recente Queda da 
Desigualdade de Renda no Brasil, p.14. 
http://www.ipea.gov.br/sites/000/2/publicacoes/NTquedaatualizada.pdf. 
IPEADATA. (2007) Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada. http://www.ipeadata.gov.br. 
Jornal Valor Econômico, (19 Jan. 2007). Contrato social impede crescimento, diz Samuel 
Pessôa, http://clipping.planejamento.gov.br/Noticias.asp?NOTCod=332746. 
Menocal, A. R. (2001) Do Old Habits Die Hard? A Statistical Exploration of the 
Politicisation of Progresa, Mexico's Latest Federal Poverty-Alleviation Programme, under the 
Zedillo Administration. Journal of Latin American Studies, v. 33, n. 03, p.513-38. 
Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social. (2006) Bolsa Família: o que é, 
http://www.mds.gov.br/programas/transferencia-de-renda/programa-bolsa-familia/programa-
bolsa-familia/o-que-e. 
Molinar, J., Weldon, J. (1994) Electoral Determinants and Consequences of National 
Solidarity, in: Cornelius, W. et al (eds.), Transforming State Society Relations in Mexico: The 
National Solidarity Strategy, La Jolla. 
Nicolau, J., Peixoto, V. (2007) As bases municipais da votação de Lula em 2006. 
http://jaironicolau.iuperj.br/ artigos%20_files/FORUM-2007.pdf. 
PNUD. (2003) Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano, IPEA/PNUD.  
Robinson, W. S. (1950) Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals, American 
Sociological Review v. 15, n. 3, p.351-357. 
Tobler, W. R. (1970) A Computer Movie Simulating Urban Growth in the Detroit Region, 
Economic Geography, v. 46, p. 236. 
TSE (2006). Centro de Divulgação da Justiça Eleitoral. http://agencia.tse.gov.br.   9 
 
Figure 1 –  Percentage of valid votes for candidate Lula by municipality in 2002 and 2006 
run-offs 














































Source: TSE (2006)   10 
Figure 2 –  Clusters with local Moran I significant at 99%, based on the percentage of  
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Source: Calculations by the authors.  
Note: p values in parentheses. State dummies have been omitted. 
  I 
Constant  -0.043 
(-0.658) 
Distance  0.009 
(0.017) 
Inequality  0.124 
(0.000) 
Demographic density  0.050 
(0.000) 
Income per capita  -0.154 
(0.000) 
Child mortality  0.037 
(0.000) 
Illiteracy  0.024 
(0.022) 
Bolsa Família  0.066 
(0.000) 
Lula’s voting in 2002  0.018 
(0.063) 
LM (lag)  861 
(0.000) 
LM (error)  1948 
(0.000) 
R
2  0.677 
F test  348 
Log Likelihood  2005 
Akaike Information Criterion  -3942 
Schwarz Information Criterion  -3717   12 
Table II – Determinants  of  candidate  Lula’s  voting  percentage  by  municipality  in  2006 
(spatial error model) 




















































Bolsa Família by 
Population 
0.041 
(0.000)     
Bolsa Família by Poor    0.012 
(0.062)   
Bolsa Família by 
















2  0.759  0,758  0.757 
Log Likelihood  2625  2608  2607 
Akaike Information 
Criterion  -5182  -5149  -5146 
Schwarz Information 
Criterion  -4957  -4924  -4921 
 
Source: Calculations by the authors.  
Note: p values in parentheses. State dummies have been omitted.    13 
Table III – Brazilian exports by federative unit – 2003-2006 in millions of US dollars 
 




RONDONIA  98  308  215% 
ACRE  5  18  233% 
AMAZONAS  1300  1523  17% 
RORAIMA  4  15  301% 
PARA  2678  6708  151% 
AMAPA  20  128  554% 
TOCANTINS  46  204  347% 
MARANHAO  740  1713  132% 
PIAUI  59  47  -20% 
CEARA  761  957  26% 
RIO GRANDE DO NORTE  310  372  20% 
PARAIBA  168  209  24% 
PERNAMBUCO  411  780  90% 
ALAGOAS  361  693  92% 
SERGIPE  39  79  103% 
BAHIA  3259  6772  108% 
MINAS GERAIS  7434  15638  110% 
ESPIRITO SANTO  3535  6720  90% 
RIO DE JANEIRO  4844  11470  137% 
SAO PAULO  23074  45930  99% 
PARANA  7153  10002  40% 
SANTA CATARINA  3696  5966  61% 
RIO GRANDE DO SUL  8013  11774  47% 
MATO GROSSO  2186  4333  98% 
GOIAS  1102  2092  90% 
DISTRITO FEDERAL  15  66  343% 
MATO GROSSO DO SUL  498  1004  102% 
Source: calculations by the authors and Aliceweb (2007). 
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Graph 1 – Per capita Exports in US dollars, 2006, and the effect of the dummies on Lula’s 
voting 
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Source: calculations by the authors and Aliceweb (2007). 
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Source: calculations by the authors and Aliceweb (2007). 